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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
In conformity with the provisions of Rule 24 (d) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Appellants 
[JOHN F GREEN and LARUE GREEN] are referred to herein 
as "the Sellers" and the Appellees [WESLEY CLOCK and 
ANNE CLOCK] are referred to herein as "the Buyers". 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Sellers are entitled to an award of 
"interest", at the 10 1/2% rate which the 
"option agreement" clearly provides . The Court 
of Appeals considering the properly-
perfected "appeal" of the 1998 "judgment" 
should award that "interest", as the parties 
contemplated and as the "option agreement" 
provides. The Buyers should not particularly 
by reason of their own failure to pay the 
monies when required be entitled to a 
"windfall" (i.e. no interest accrues, against 
either the contract purchase price or the 
2 
judgment arising from the contract) when they 
have agreed otherwise! 
2. The Sellers' present appeal is 
meritorious. The Buyers have not been harmed 
in any way by this "appeal". The vesting of 
title occurred (or could have occurred), in 
accordance with the express provisions of the 
1998 "judgment" (framed and decided after 
almost two years of subsequent litigation, on 
remand after the appeal) at the time the 
Buyers deposited the purchase monies. The 
award of attorney's fees, not provided for in 
the written contract, is inappropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE SELLERS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF INTEREST 
AGAINST THEIR FORBEARANCE AND UPON THE JUDGMENT 
The Buyers argue that the Sellers are not entitled 
to an award of interest. The Sellers claim they are so 
entitled. 
The Buyers' arguments and position (i.e. that the 
Sellers are not entitled to an award of interest) are 
flawed, for several reasons. 
The Buyers' entire case their claims and their 
entitlements thereunder is foundationed upon the 1991 




I Wesley Clock and Anne Clock agree to pay 
$675.00 per month Plus Sewer and water. There 
is a $350.00 deposit plus $1,000 for a lease 
option to buy. Starting July 29, 1991 prorated 
to Aug. 4, 1991, the selling price to be 
$81500 at 10 1/2% interest. When option is 
picked up, the $3 5 0. 0 0 plus the $1, 0 0 0. 0 0 will 
be applied to the down Payment of $5,000 or 
more. The Seller will re-roof and make the 
carport into a double garage, replace the back 
door. Other than the things above, the Clocks 
will take care of any repairs during the 
option period. There will be a balloon payment 
due on the balance of the loan Aug 5, 1996. 
The rent to be pro-rated from July 29, 1991 to 
Aug 4, 1991. Rent to begin on Aug 5, 1991. 
August 2, $500.00; Aug 5, $7 0 0.00. Balance by 
Aug 20, 1991. If the Clocks do not buy they 
will be renters and Money will not be 
refunded. 
/s/ Anne Clock 
/s/ Wesley Clock 
/s/ John F. Green 
/s/ LaRue Green 
Emphasis added. [RECORD at 0005 and 0042.] [A photocopy 
of the Agreement is included in Seller's original Brief 
as ADDENDUM #1.] It is this written agreement which 
gives the parties their rights AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS 
thereunder. The trial court and the Court of Appeals 
have found and adjudicated that the "option agreement" 
was enforceable until August 1996 and that the Buyers 
attempted to exercise their rights under the "option" 
prior to its expiration. The trial court ruled against 
the Sellers in their claim that the Buyers had years 
before 1996 breached the agreement; that ruling was 
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implicitly affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals. 
Neither court expressly ruled upon the provisions 
contained within the "option agreement" pertaining to 
the "purchase price of $81,500 at 10 1/2% interest" as 
clearly contained within the "option agreement". 
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code, provides: 
(1) The parties to a lawful 
contract may agree upon any rate of 
interest for the loan or forbearance 
of any money, goods or chose in 
action that is the subject of their 
contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful 
contract specify a different rate of 
interest, the legal rate of interest 
for the loan or forbearance of any 
money, goods, or chose in action 
shall be 10% per annum. 
Emphasis added. Section 15-1-3, Utah Code, provides: 
Whenever in any statute or deed, or 
written or verbal contract, or in any public 
or private instrument whatever, any certain 
rate of interest is mentioned and no period of 
time is stated, interest shall be calculated 
at the rate mentioned by the year. 
Emphasis added. 
In the instant situation, the "lease-option" 
agreement specifies "10 1/2% interest". It is 
reasonable to construe the contract that the "selling 
price" is to be adjusted by that amount. [Whether the 
transaction is also characterized as a "loan" probably 
doesn't matter. What does matter is that the Agreement 
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clearly contains the provision and, in light of the 
contract construction principles identified in Point I 
of Sellers original Brief, the provision MUST BE GIVEN 
SOME MEANING AND EFFECT!] 
Section 15-1-4, Utah Code, provides: 
(1) Any judgment rendered on a lawful 
contract shall conform to the contract and 
shall bear interest agreed upon by the 
parties, which shall be specified in the 
judgment. 
(2) Other judgments shall bear interest at 
the federal postjudgment interest rate as of 
January 1 of each year, plus 2%. 
Emphasis added. 
A 
INTEREST ACCRUING AGAINST 
PRE-1996 FORBEARANCE AND OBLIGATION 
As noted, neither the trial court nor the Court of 
Appeals directly ruled on the issue. The procedural 
context in which the appeal arose and the conflicting 
views of the parties were such that the issue simply 
was not raised in the first appeal. Thus, it strains 
credibility to state (as the Buyers do) that the matter 
was decided and has thus become "the law of the case". 
The Court of Appeals simply did not adjudicate the 
issue. Thus, we are not presented with a situation 
wherein the Court is being requested to re-examine an 
issue which has already been decided. The interest 
6 
issue was simply NOT decided. 
B 
INTEREST ACCRUING AGAINST 
POST-1996 FORBEARANCE AND OBLIGATION 
Even if the September 1996 "ORDER & JUDGMENT" 
entered by the trial court failed to include the award 
of "interest" accruing prior to that time, then 
certainly the judgment ought to bear interest as a 
"matter of law", as previously declared by case law 
decision [Dairy Farmers] and by statute [Section 15-1-
4, Utah Code] 
If this is not the case, then the Court is ignoring 
a major provision of the "option agreement" and that's 
not fair! The "interest" provision "at 10 l/2%" is 
something the Buyers agreed to! The Buyers cannot now 
be heard to complain that the very "option agreement" 
which they have been so strident about enforcing 
according to its terms is ENFORCED AGAINST THEM (THE 
BUYERS) , in the same manner! If such is not done, then 
the Court is not enforcing the contract as written. 
The post-1996 "interest" is a substantial sum: by 
September 1999 three years after the September 1996 
"judgment" was first entered by the trial court and 
about the time the case will be heard by the Court of 
Appeals the interest will be approximately $24,000! 
[3 years x 10.5% per year x 76,500 unpaid balance = 
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$24,097.50. The Record is unclear whether the $3650 
deposited "into court" was ever released to Surety 
Title Company. The foregoing calculation nevertheless 
gives the Buyers "credit" for such transfer as though 
it had been timely made.] Apparently, the Buyers too 
feel that such is a sizeable sum: they have 
intentionally failed to "close" on the purchase, 
pending resolution of the appeal. [As noted in Point 
II, below, the 1998 "judgment" of the trial court 
from which this "second appeal" is taken does NOT 
prevent the Buyers from closing. In fact, the vesting 
of title in the names of the Buyers is not conditioned 
upon the Sellers doing anything. The vesting can occur, 
as a matter of law, as soon as the Buyers will pay to 
the title company the remainder of the purchase 
monies.] That they have waited now over three years 
(from the time they first sought to exercise the 
option) certainly should invoke the payment of the 
"interest" the interest at the rate stated in the 
contract which they signed! Th$ Buyers have not only 
had full use of their money for those three years; they 
have also had full use of the property! 
The District Court initially adjudicated the case 
pursuant to jointly-filed motions for summary judgment. 
The Buyers moved for summary judgment on the basis of 
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their averments that they (as Buyers) had presented a 
notice of intent to exercise the "option" within a 
timely fashion. The Sellers moved for summary judgment 
in their favor on the basis that the Buyers' 
notification was defective, in that the Buyers were in 
breach of the agreement because they had failed to make 
the required down payment and because the option was 
not exercised in a timely manner. The specific issue of 
the price to be paid as required by the "at 10 1/2% 
interest" phrase was NOT directly raised or 
adjudicated. The District Court ruled in favor of the 
Buyers. The Sellers appealed. The Utah Supreme Court 
"poured-over" the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
which issued an unpublished opinion, affirming the 
District Court's judgment in favor of the Buyers. The 
Utah Supreme Court ultimately denied the Defendant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
Following the filing of the first appeal, the 
Buyers (as purchasers) took no action to comply with 
provisions of the agreement concerning the exercise of 
the "option" and/or the Court's judgment upholding the 
option and its exercise. The Buyers tendered no money 
to the Sellers, although they continued to reside upon 
the premises. 
On remand, the District Court over the objection 
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of the Sellers entered judgment in favor of the 
Buyers, automatically quieting title to the real estate 
in the name of the Buyers, upon their deposit with the 
title company of the "option" price. The "at 10 1/2% 
interest" clause (pertaining to the purchase price) was 
given NO EFFECT by the trial court. This latter 
judgment which is the basis of the instant appeal 
failed to take into account the provisions of agreement 
concerning the "at 10 1/2% interest" as such affected 
(i.e. increased) the purchase price. The District Court 
also seemingly ignored the contractual provisions 
characterizing the purchase transaction as a "loan". 
The major flaw in the Buyers' argument [that the 
appeal (or that the appellate consideration of this 
issue) is time-barred] is that the argument ignores all 
of the facts and the procedural history of this case. 
In the first instance, the Court of Appeals did NOT 
rule on the "interest issue". [A careful reading of the 
abbreviated "memorandum decision" confirms this fact.] 
Before the Court of Appeals were simply a couple of 
conflicting issues: the Buyers asserted that they were 
entitled to enforce the "option" agreement. The 
Sellers as original appellants responded that the 
"option" was not exercisable, due to the fact that it 
was not exercised in a timely fashion. The original 
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appeal followed from a decision of the district court 
in a "summary judgment" setting. On appeal, the Sellers 
argued that there were genuine issues of material fact 
to preclude summary judgment. The Court of Appeals 
determined otherwise. The "interest" issue was not 
presented to the Court of Appeals, because it was not 
an issue at the time. In the minds of the parties (and 
their counsel) , THE issue concerning the appeal was the 
appropriateness of the summary judgment disposition and 
the terms of the "option", not the judgment. 
Furthermore, as indicated below, the judgment should 
have incorporated the "interest" provisions of the 
"option" agreement, as a matter of law [per Dairy 
Distributors, infra] , whether the judgment said so or 
not. 
The Court of Appeals decision a "Memorandum 
Decision" designated "not for publication" is brief 
and to the point: to resolve the "option" issue and 
that's it. 
The cases cited by Buyers are generally 
inapplicable to the case at bar. The Sellers' reliance 
upon Schoney vs Memorial Estates, Incorporated, 8 63 
P.2d 59 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993), is misplaced. 
Schoney involved a second appeal where the issue was 
thoroughly litigated, by both the trial court AND the 
ll 
appellate court; such is not the case at bar. 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the case 
of Dairy Distributors, Incorporated vs Local Union 97 6, 
Joint Council 87, Western Conference of Teamsters, to 
be directly on point and to be controlling. In Dairy 
Distributors the Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
[cited, but omitted, cases] . . . will be 
found to actually support plaintiff' s position 
in recognizing that the interest follows the 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Our statute, Sec. 15-1-4, Utah Code Ann. 
1953, provides that unless otherwise agreed by 
the parties, » * * * judgments shall bear 
interest at the rate of eight per cent per 
annum." This interest follows the judgment as 
a matter of law and would be collectible even 
though the judgment did not so provide. See 
Blair v. Durham, 139 F.2d 260 (6th Circuit 
1943) . The trial court in no way transgressed 
its authority in filling in the omission and 
making the record show what was true under the 
law anyway. Its action was in conformity with 
the well-established precept that mere lapse 
of time will not prevent the court from 
correcting errors or omissions. We so 
recognized in the recent case of Kettner v. 
Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28, stating 
that " * * * in proper circumstances where the 
interests of justice so require, the court has 
power to act nunc pro tunc, that is, to do an 
act upon one date and make it effective as of 
a prior date. It is recognized that clerical 
errors may be corrected or omissions supplied 
so the record will accurately reflect that 
which in fact took place." To the same effect 
see Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 195, 381 
P.2d 78. 
563 P.2d at . Emphasis added. 
If the obligation to pay interest follows the 
(first) judgment "as a matter of law", then there 
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simply was no need to raise that issue at the first 
appeal. When Judge Wilkinson refused in 1998 
following remand subsequent to the Court of Appeals 
decision to order the assessment of interest against 
the purchase price to be paid (in 1998), the appealed 
issue became "ripe". 
The irony inherent in the objection of the Buyers 
as to the "interest" issue is the fact that they 
struggled so hard to convince the Court of Appeals that 
the "option" contract was enforceable, according to its 
terms. The Court of Appeals accepted that argument and 
so held. Now the Buyers want to ignore the "interest" 
provisions. 
The Buyers have not been harmed at all. They have 
been allowed (since 1991) to live in the house, 
according to the "rental" provisions (i.e. payment of 
$675 per month). Since 1996 they have been allowed 
per the trial court's order to live there rent-free. 
In the intervening three years that this case has 
taken "on appeal", what should the purchase price 
actually be? Whether that purchase price reflects the 
pre-1996 accruing interest "at 10 1/2% interest" as the 
"option" contract clearly states is one question. 
Whether the "interest" applies to post-1996 interest is 
a second and totally different question. The 
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Appellants are entitled to a judicial decision on both. 
That Judge Wilkinson of the trial court in 1996 
refused to require interest at the "10 1/2% interest" 
as the contract clearly provides IS an appealable 
issue. [The "judgment" bears interest, "as a matter of 
law", per Dairy Distributors, supra.] That for the 
intervening three years (1996 to 1999) NO interest was 
included in the purchase price to be paid (??) by the 
Buyers hurry) is presently appealable! 
The issue is NOT as the Buyers are prone to so 
characterize it whether the judgment is "personal" or 
for a "sum certain"; THE ISSUE is whether the 
provisions of the statute will be followed, by 
incorporating the "10 1/2% interest" which so readily 
appears on the face of the "option" agreement. The 
original "agreement" and the "judgment", whether from 
1996 OR 1998, it doesn't matter is specific enough! 
Furthermore, the Buyers should not be entitled to 
profit from sloppy drafting of the "judgment". 
If the "10 1/2% interest1^ phrase does not mean 
exactly this result, then what does the phrase mean? 
The parties (in 1991) obviously had intended some 
meaning for it! What simply does it mean? The Buyers, 
having prevailed on the enforceability of the "option" 
agreement, cannot now be heard to complain if the 
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"option" is enforced according to its clear import! 
The Buyers acknowledge [p. 12 of their brief] that 
the "option agreement" provides for the assessment of 
interest. The Sellers' explanation, however, as to when 
that interest is actually invoked is not only 
confusing, but it is not supported in the Record (due 
to the procedural context in which this case was 
litigated and adjudicated by the trial court) . Further, 
the Buyers' version as to what the "at 10 1/2% 
interest" means flies directly in the face of the 
written agreement and the reasonable meaning of the 
selected language. It is ludicrous to assert as 
Buyers do that the phrase only has meaning IF AND 
WHEN a "contract purchase" was to be invoked! The whole 
transaction was, in essence, "a contract purchase" 
(whatever that term-of-art phrase might mean)! 
The more logical, reasonable explanation as to the 
meaning of the phrase "purchase price of $81,500 at 10 
1/2% interest", particularly when coupled with the 
"balloon payment" and "loan" phrases found later within 
the text of the option agreement, is that the purchase 
price was to increase over time: at 10 1/2% per year, 
as the option went on. It makes absolutely no sense to 
think otherwise! Why would any person sell a structure 
for the same price five years LATER? The Sellers didn't 
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intend such. 
The Sellers and the Buyers clearly agreed to 
written provisions which clearly provide that 
"interest" is to accrue to the outstanding obligation, 
until it is actually paid. That the Buyers have 
voluntarily chosen to wait for almost THREE YEARS and 
haven't yet paid the purchase price should invoke the 
"interest" provisions specified in the "option 
agreement". 
II 
CLAIMED FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
AND 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
The instant appeal is not frivolous or filed in bad 
faith. The Sellers should be entitled to have an 
appellate decision on the "10 1/2 interest" phrase 
clearly contained within the "option" agreement. They 
to this date have not had such a decision. 
As far as the statements of the Buyers that the 
appeal has caused the Buyers to incur additional 
attorney's fees and/or to wait to "close", such 
problems are of their own making. 
As written, the 1998 judgment from which this 
appeal is taken does NOT require the Sellers to do 
anything. The "judgment" is clear: it unequivocally 
states, in relevant part: 
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1. Plaintiffs are quieted in fee simple as 
to the following described property . . . 
Said real property shall hereby be quieted in 
the Plaintiffs, Wesley Clock and Ann (sic) 
Clock, upon their deposit of the sum of 
$76,500 plus the sum of $3,650 now held by the 
court with Surety Title Company. 
5. Evidence of the quieting title in the 
plaintiffs shall be sufficient upon the 
recording of a notice by Surety Title Company 
evidencing the deposit of the funds required 
herein. 
Emphasis added. All the Buyers [the Clocks] have to do 
is deposit the money [$76,500 and the $3,650, held in 
court] with Surety Title Company, record a "notice" and 
the property is theirs! There is simply nothing for the 
Sellers to do. Thus, the Buyers' assertions that the 
resultant (from the appeal) delay is causing a "cloud 
on their title" [Summary Disposition Motion] is 
absolutely false, for legal and factual reasons! 
The Court must remember, also, that the particular 
"form" of the 1998 "judgment" was prepared solely by 
Buyers' counsel. It apparently conforms to the trial 
court's "decision", as Judge Wilkinson signed it. The 
"judgment" (order) is operative, IMMEDIATELY: all the 
Buyers have to do is deposit the money. 
The fact that this Court might rule that they have 
to pay "interest" at the "10 1/2% interest" rate as the 
"option" agreement clearly specifies might cause them 
some discomfort in finally "closing" (by depositing the 
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money with Surety Title Company), but that's not the 
fault of the Greens. The "judgment" has been prepared 
the way the Buyers' counsel wanted it; the Sellers are 
not the cause of any delay as to the "closing". 
The Buyers have changed their position: in the 
present they seek to have the Court enforce the 1996 
"judgment". And yet in the trial court below, the 
Buyers sought (and obtained) other relief. The 
introductory phrase of the 1998 "judgment" is that 
Buyers had moved for "summary judgment", which was 
granted. [It is important to note that it is Buyers' 
counsel who prepared the Order! It is Buyers who framed 
up the issues in the trial court!] The Buyers-Appellees 
have NOT filed a "cross-appeal" (of the 1998 
"judgment") and now should not be heard to complain 
about it. 
Buyers have previously claimed [paragraph 3 of the 
Wesley Clock affidavit, submitted with the Summary 
Disposition motion] that 
"Surety Title informs us that they will not 
insure title until the second appeal is 
resolved. Thus, the Greens' have clouded the 
title to the property to delay the closing." 
[Paragraph 3 of Wesley Clock affidavit.] That's 
absolutely incorrect. As written, the 1998 "judgment" 
easily works through that contingency. The Sellers are 
not required (by court order) to "close"; rather, the 
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vesting of title operates as a matter of law, by reason 
of the Court's judgment! That the title company chosen 
by the purchaser (the Clocks) won't insure title 
pending the second "appeal" is not the fault of the 
Greens, who cannot be expected to give up their 
appellate rights to have the "option" contract enforced 
according to its terms. The Sellers are not "clouding" 
the title. Nor is the "closing" delayed! The Buyers 
merely need to pay the money and the property is 
theirs. [The instant "appeal" might have the result 
that the Clocks might have to pay more than the $81,500 
price they agreed to in 19 91, BUT THAT'S BECAUSE THAT 
IS WHAT THE "OPTION" CONTRACT THEY SIGNED SAID WAS TO 
HAPPEN! That the purchase price would increase "at 10 
1/2% interest". So when they finally pay in 1999 or 
later more than three years after the 1996 date 
(which iss the absolute latest date contemplated by the 
parties as to the transfer of the parcel), shouldn't 
the Buyers pay the amount they agreed to? The Sellers 
think so, and have filed this appeal to enforce the 
contract, according to its terms. 
It appears that Judge Wilkinson (and perhaps even 
Buyers' counsel) framed up the 1998 "judgment" so as to 
avoid a situation wherein the Sellers represented by 
other counsel, not counsel handling this appeal might 
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refuse to sign over the necessrry conveyances. The 1998 
judgment doesn't require that they do! The 1998 
"judgment" provides the quiet title vesting upon the 
deposit of the Buyers' monies with Surety Title. Those 
Buyers cannot now be heard to complain about "delay" or 
"clouds on title", because the vesting of time is 
entirely within their control! 
With respect to the sanctions the Buyers-Appellees 
have requested this Court impose for the "appeal" 
and/or the claimed "delay" and "cloud on title" 
effected thereby, those same arguments were, in 
essence, advanced before Judge Wilkinson. However, 
Judge Wilkinson's "minute entry", dated as of 6 August 
1998, indicates that "sanctions are reserved". [See 
1998 "judgment", ATTACHMENT #2 to Sellers' original 
brief.] As heretofore stated, Buyers have not filed a 
"cross-appeal" from the 1998 "judgment". Those Buyers 
cannot now be heard to complain on those issues. 
If there is a res judicata or "law of the case" 
concept applicable to the instant situation, it is that 
the Buyers cannot now be heard to complain about the 
1998 "judgment". They procured it. They prepared it! 
That "j udgment" in procedure and substance was 
obviously designed to supersede and take the place of 
the 1996 "judgment". The 1998 "judgment" is THE final 
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judgment from which this appeal is properly perfected. 
The Sellers should be allowed to raise the "interest" 
issue which the trial court has failed to resolve. 
In each appeal the Sellers did NOT file a 
supersedeas bond to prevent the Buyers from complying 
with the judgment. Thus, the fact that the instant 
appeal has been filed has in no way, shape or form 
harmed the Buyers in any particular! Their claim for 
sanctions and/or an award of attorney's fees is 
inappropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
The contractually-stated "interest" follows the 
judgment, "as a matter of law". Dairy Distributors, 
supra. Thus, there was no necessity for the first 
appeal to address that issue. Only when Judge Wilkinson 
refused to honor the contractual terms (in 1998) did it 
become apparent that the issue arose, which prompted 
this appeal. The Appellants should be entitled to have 
the appellate court correct the trial court's error in 
not so including that interest. The Court of Appeals 
should award the Sellers their interest, at the "10 
1/2%" per year rate, from 1991 but at least from 1996! 
The Sellers' appeal is meritorious. The Buyers' 
claim for attorney's fees incurred on appeal is 
improper. If there has been any deleterious effect upon 
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the Buyers from the delay, that effect arises from 
their own shortcomings in failing to follow the 1998 
"judgment", as carefully crafted by the Court and as 
prepared by that counsel. The Defendant's are not 
obligated to do anything: title "vests" when the Buyers 
deposit the money! It's that simple! 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of June, 1999. 
^HENJ>^HOMER 
Attorney for Appellants 
JOHN F GREEN and 
LARUE GREEN 
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